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ABSTRACT Network Security Monitoring (NSM) is a popular term to refer to the detection of security
incidents by monitoring the network events. An NSM system is central for the security of current networks,
given the escalation in sophistication of cyberwarfare. In this paper, we review the state-of-the-art in NSM,
and derive a new taxonomy of the functionalities and modules in an NSM system. This taxonomy is useful
to assess current NSM deployments and tools for both researchers and practitioners. We organize a list of
popular tools according to this new taxonomy, and identify challenges in the application of NSM in modern
network deployments, like Software Defined Network (SDN) and Internet of Things (IoT).
INDEX TERMS Network security, NSM, security monitoring, incident detection, incident response, SDN,
IoT.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although most of the efforts in network security are still
focused on preventing attacks, solutions and techniques
based in detection and response are gaining more and
more relevance [1], [2]. There is a general belief within
the Information Technology (IT) Security community that,
sooner or later, prevention measures are surpassed by attack-
ers. At that point, detection and response mechanisms need
to be applied [3]. Network Security Monitoring (NSM) is one
of the most relevant approaches for network security [4].
The NSM cycle can be characterized by four phases [4],
[5]: 1) Monitoring, 2) Detection, 3) Forensics/Diagnosis, and
4) Response/Recovery. Its goal is to monitor the state of a
given network to detect abnormal events and, when detected,
to manage them in a timely manner. This is a significant
challenge, since communication networks produce a huge
volume of data at a high pace, following the definition of a
Big Data problem [6]. This is even a more difficult task if
we consider the pervasive nature of present and upcoming
scenarios, such as 5G and the IoT, or the adaptation to new
network technologies (e.g., SDN) [7], [8].
In this paper, we review the state-of-the-art in NSM, aiming
to provide a taxonomy and a unified description of its com-
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ponents. We also look over some of the existing solutions
according to this taxonomy. Finally, we analyze the most
relevant trends inmodern networks, the (new) challenges they
pose, and how they are tackled from the NSM perspective.
We evaluate the use of the aforementioned traditional tools
for NSM to modern networks, as well as we review existing
solutions and novel works for this new framework. Thus,
the main contributions of this work are:
• Amodular taxonomy for detection and response sys-
tems according to the NSM philosophy.
• A classification of some for the trade solutions follow-
ing the proposed taxonomy.
• An evaluation on the application of NSM for modern
networks.
• New challenges in network security for new communi-
cation paradigms, according to the proposed taxonomy.
This paper is addressed from a different and complemen-
tary standpoint to previous works [9]–[14], which only cover
partially the NSM cycle and do not tackle it from a module
taxonomy perspective, as it is proposed in this paper. This
modular taxonomy aims helping researchers and practitioners
to understand features, benefits and lacks in current detection
and response for network security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces a taxonomy which describes the main components
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and architecture of an NSM system. Section III includes a
review of some of the best known commercial and open
source available tools, following the proposed taxonomy.
Section IV evaluates the benefits and challenges of applying
NSM to modern networks. Finally, Section V presents the
main conclusions derived from this work.
II. MODULAR TAXONOMY OF A NETWORK SECURITY
MONITORING SYSTEM
An NSM system should be able to provide traceability of the
activities and processes that take place in the network and
subsystems under monitoring. To achieve this goal, a typi-
cal NSM architecture is composed of different software and
hardware elements that are distributed thorough the network.
These elements send information about network events to a
centralized point, where they are recorded and analyzed.
A comprehensive review on themost used NSM systems has
leaded us to propose a taxonomy of the NSM functionalities.
Most of these solutions implement at least one of these func-
tionalities: sensor, parser, integrator, detector, inspector, and
actuator.
• Sensor collects data from a network subsystem. Result-
ing data are in the form of records or logs.
• Parser transforms data format.
• Integrator combines multiple sources of data into a
single data stream.
• Detector identifies anomalous events/records in a data
stream.
• Inspector allows data exploration.
• Actuator performs automatic actions on the net-
work/subsystem configuration.
These are inherently modular systems, which make it eas-
ier the scalability to build more complex systems. This is
achieved by combining the outputs of different modules. For
example, the output of an integrator (A) could be the input
for a second integrator (B), which is also combined with a
detector (C), thus creating a hierarchical detection structure.
In addition, not all NSM systems implement all functionali-
ties.
Sensor, parser and integrator are usually enclosed in the
monitoring phase, while the rest of the modules have a one-
to-one relation with the remaining steps in the NSM cycle
(detection, forensics and response). The NSM modules are
described in the following paragraphs.
A. SENSOR MODULE
A sensor is a software agent and/or hardware appliance that
collects data from the network, generating logs or records to
be analyzed by a security team. This module usually includes
the functionality to send the collected data to a centralized
location, where such information can be accessed and ana-
lyzed.
More simple sensors, like traffic sniffers, are composed of
a collector module alone. Other more complex sensors often
include some form of parser and/or detection module. When
these complex sensors are complete security tools which
output is captured and utilized as a part of another top system,
we call them security sensors.
B. PARSER MODULE
NSM deployments with numerous and disparate sensors result
in massive databases from which detecting when and where
there is an attack is a challenging task. Besides, the data
format varies widely among the set of sensors [15], [16].
For this reason, after data collection, data sources need to be
processed to become fit for purpose.
In spite of the attempts to provide unification models for
the exchange of alert information, such as Intrusion Detection
Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [15], [17], one of the
main problems in data collection is that manufacturers, when
designing the devices and software, do not usually follow
a standardized format for information logging. This implies
the need of a parsing process. Parsing is the process of
identifying and extracting individual parts that compose a log
to obtain a logical and organized data structure [15]. Thus,
parsing allows to extract useful information from the data and
homogenize different sources to a common format [15], [17].
For instance, IP addresses can be located in different parts of
the log file depending on the sensor. In such case, the parsing
process is useful to identify the IP addresses on each available
log and match them in order to combine different sources in a
meaningful way. This process is needed to feed detection and
visualization tools that require structured information.1
The parsing process can be performed ad-hoc (by secu-
rity operators), and it can be often implemented either as a
separate module or as a part of the sensor or the integra-
tor modules. On the other hand, parsing can be performed
either scripting-based or software-based. The former refers
to Linux commands and to scripting-based programming (e.g.
python or perl), while the latter refers to programs that have
been developed to optimize the extraction of information
from complex data [20]–[22].
Finally, there are some challenges related to the parsing,
namely: i) sensitivity of the parsing code to format changes
in the sensors, usually caused by updates in their specifica-
tions or even their functionalities; ii) scarcity of information
about the format used by each manufacturer; and iii) lack
of synchronization in the timestamp of sensors, which can
be especially challenging if they are distributed in different
countries with distinct time zones and do not make use of syn-
chronization services like Network Time Protocol (NTP) [15].
1Structured data refers to those data that can be well organized in fields
and follow a specific structure (e.g.ZIP code). They are suitable for relational
databases. Unstructured data refers to those data that do not follow a
specific format and have not been processed yet. These come from variate
sources and are heterogeneous data, which can be images, post from social
networks, or sensor data, among others. Unstructured data are not suitable for
relational databases. Semi-structured data refers to data that are typically
unstructured but contain some metadata or tags that allow to describe them
(e.g. XML). They are not suitable for relational databases [18], [19].
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C. INTEGRATOR MODULE
Integrators combine the data collected by the sensors to
extend their semantic information. Different approaches can
be implemented in form of integration engines. The integra-
tionmodule can include one or more integration engines that
work complementary together to make disparate data become
useful information. The following paragraphs describe some
of the most extended approaches to implement data integra-
tion.
Having redundant data is a frequent problemwhen data are
collected from different data sources, which can be solved
by correlating events. The term correlation in IT Security is
applied to find connections among distinct data sources or IT
Security events.2 Correlating events may be particularly use-
ful when i) they are duplicated due to different nodes are gen-
erating events and/or alerts related to the same incident, or ii)
they are related to the same incident in the same sampling
time period and can be unified into a single event. Like this,
event correlation provides the following benefits: i) extending
the semantic information by considering the context of the
event, ii) reducing the volume of data to be analyzed, and iii)
escalating and prioritizing important events, thus reducing
the number of false positives. This yields useful information
for the detection of attacks or abnormal activities, especially
when they affect different assets [16], [17], [23].
Another mechanism that allows data integration is pivot-
ing. Pivoting refers to the ability of going from one data
source to another, which is usually performed by using links
to navigate among windows that show related information.
Thus, if there is an incident, the security operator will be
able to investigate it and obtain contextual information. Let
us imagine that there is a record that has been signaled as
anomalous. By means of pivoting, it is possible to jump from
the record to another windowwith detailed information of the
related IPs, such as reputation information, whois, or domain
names. Thus, pivoting reduces considerably the time needed
to investigate a security incident (especially if the pivoting is
graphically assisted) [24].
Finally, a further form of integration is the one used when
Machine Learning (ML) techniques are applied over security
data. In the context of ML, integration is often referred to
as data fusion. Fusion allows to obtain a single stream of
data from several disparate sources that can be dealt with
properly by the rest of the modules. Data fusion is frequently
classified in: low, middle and high, depending on how the
sequence of data fusion and modeling is done through ML.
If data fusion is performed from raw data, before modeling,
then it is called low-level. If it is done after some form of
data transformation or feature extraction, then it is called
middle-level. If data fusion takes place after ML modeling
and combines the output of several ML techniques, is called
high-level [25]–[27].
2Note that the term correlation in IT security has a different meaning to
the traditional one in statistics.
D. DETECTOR MODULE
This is an essential part in an NSM system. Detectors are
actually engines which goal is to detect suspicious behavior in
the data. The volume of data to be analyzed can be reduced by
filtering or grouping data, by feature extraction (considering
only those features that are of interest) [28], [29], or by using
a correlation engine [16], [17], [23].
Detection engines are usually classified in signature-
based, if they use a library of patterns (e.g. rules or traces
of code) to detect known attacks, and data-driven, if they
use models of normal behavior to detect abnormal activi-
ties [5], [28]–[31]. The latter can also be i) statistical-based,
ii) knowledge-based, and iii) ML-based [29], [30].
In general, the main drawbacks of signature-based detec-
tion are the need for frequent updates of the signature
database, and the inability to detect zero-day attacks [31].
When data-driven detection isML-based, supervised methods
cannot detect zero-day attacks either, although they have a
high performance detecting known attacks. Finally, unsu-
pervised detection can in principle detect zero-day attacks,
although it may generate many false alarms. Thus, a main
challenge of unsupervised detection is to reduce the amount
of false alarms, which can be performed by prioritizing and/or
visualizing the events [15], [32]. This can also be achieved
thanks to existing lists that contain events likely reported as
false positives, which allow to avoid escalating those events
as alarms [5], [33], [34].
In general terms, the number of security events, the veloc-
ity, and the pace in which they are generated is so high
that security operators usually cannot handle all of them,
and proper prioritization/triaging turns mandatory [15]. This
can be achieved by defining metrics going beyond those
traditionally used for the capability of detection (e.g.Receiver
Operating Characteristics (ROC) or Area Under the Curve
(AUC)). These metrics should provide information about the
importance of an anomaly, rather than only detecting whether
a given event is anomalous or net [35].
E. INSPECTOR MODULE
The NSM cycle includes the diagnosis of the detected IT
Security incidents. This step helps the analysts to identify
the root causes of the incident (forensics) so that problems
within the network can be timely identified and corrected
for [35], [36]. Besides, when an IT Security incident takes
place, it is advisable recording the current state of the system
and network. This may involve saving configurations, logs,
users logged in the system or processes that where running
when the incident occurred. The inspectormodule is respon-
sible of performing these tasks. Additionally, it is desirable
that this module includes a diagnosis engine, which can help,
in combination with the detection component, to prioritize
and triage the events [37].
Diagnosis is usually related to forensics tasks, where the
origin of the alarm needs to be found [38]. To do this, we need
to find the location of the incident, which is related to both
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the physical origin of the alarm (e.g. devices or sensors) and
to the timing in which the incident took place (e.g. when it
started and its extension in time). This is a difficult task that
is usually performed manually by security operators [38],
[39], although some works have proposed ML-based solu-
tions to tackle this problem [40]–[44]. For example, authors
in [40] propose two solutions: the first one ismodel-based and
the second one is data-driven. Diagnosis is also dealt in the
context of black boxML by using gradients in an unsupervised
way [41]. These methods are frequently complex, since they
require a big effort to implement and are hard to interpret for
an analyst. Interpretation becomes easier if linear methods are
applied, such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [42],
[43]. In any case, using linear methods for diagnosis simpli-
fies the definition of the inspector module, which allows to
identify the variables related to a previously detected incident.
F. ACTUATOR MODULE
After an IT Security incident takes place and it is detected by
the NSM system, the response and recovery of the system are
of main importance. The aim of this step is recovering the
affected systems to a secure state to minimize loses and dam-
ages suffered by the compromised organization. This stage
can be carried out manually, by security operators; or auto-
matically, by using an actuator module that implements
response policies and actions against certain events [3], [45],
[46]. Some authors [45] recommend following an OODA
(Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop, which allows facing the
attacks efficiently. This cycle is closely related to the NSM
philosophy.
Typical response actions are discarding or modifying traf-
fic that is related to the attack [34], as well as creating and
restoring security backups [45]–[47]. In addition, reducing
permissions and/or changing passwords for involved users
in the affected network, as well as isolating and cleaning
infected hardware and software can be other typical responses
after an IT Security Incident is detected [47], [48]. Another
advisable action (which is also related to the inspector mod-
ule) is to register and analyze all events, records and acts
related to the incident, so that similar problems can be
detected and efficiently dealt with, or even prevented, in the
future [48], [49].
Finally, one of the most important actions after detecting
an IT Security Incident is to notify it to the stakeholders
(e.g.workers, clients and/or corresponding authorities) so that
they are aware of the issue and can take additional actions if
needed [48], [50]. Yet, this action should not be considered
as a single mechanism of response, but a complement to
be applied in combination with any of the aforementioned
response actions.
III. NSM SOLUTIONS IN THE MARKET
This section reviews some of the tools for the trade, fol-
lowing the modular taxonomy proposed in this paper. This
classification starts with sensors and parsers, which are often
found implemented in form of individual solutions, namely
single-module solutions. Then, we present some examples
of network security products that implement several NSM
modules, namely multi-module solutions. Finally, as a part
of the multi-module solutions, we include a collection of
security tools that may be also considered as security sensors.
A. SINGLE-MODULE SOLUTIONS
In this part of the section, we enumerate different types of
single sensors, which can be classified according to the type
and origin of data that they collect in: i) Network Traffic Sen-
sors, and ii) Log and State Sensors. Then, we present different
types of single parsers, which can be classified according to
their way of working in: i) Command-based Parsers, and ii)
Software-based Parsers.
1) NETWORK TRAFFIC SENSORS
Traffic data can be collected directly from the network in
different formats. Some of these formats are packets, traffic
flows, and traffic statistics. All of them are described in the
next paragraphs.
PACKETS
Each communication that uses the TCP/IP protocol stack is
split into packets, which are individually routed to their des-
tination [4], [5], [33]. Sensors usually capture packets using
a programming library such as libpcap [51] and store them
for later analysis. The most common format for the storage
is pcap, a binary format that can be read by almost any
sniffer and traffic analysis tool [4], [5], [15], [32]. There exist
several tools for collecting network traffic. The most popular
areWireshark [32], [52] and tcpdump [51], which listen in a
network interface and display or store the collected network
traffic. They analyze the raw data from complete packets,
displaying their information in an understandable format to
users. Wireshark offers a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to
explore packets, together with a command line tool, tshark,
while tcpdump only offers command line options [4], [5],
[15], [24], [32], [33]. Tshark provides a more powerful and
complex syntax to analyze traffic than tcpdump. However,
in practice,tcpdump is themost used since it is more simple.
Wireshark can also be employed to obtain flows, sessions
and traffic statistics [52].
The main drawback of capturing packets is that it implies a
huge volume of information, rendering it impractical for long
captures. An alternative solution is to filter data to reduce the
size of the capture [32].
TRAFFIC FLOWS
The information extracted from traffic flows provides a
higher abstraction level, reducing the volume of data stored in
comparison to packet captures, while still allowing a consid-
erable amount of information. Traffic flows are also known
as traffic sessions. One of the most extended protocols to
capture flows is NetFlow, which was developed by Cisco
Systems to extract and send information of traffic flows [53].
Although NetFlow was not originally developed for IT
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Security, it is widely used in this context, since it provides a
highly valuable summary of the flows. Two of the most rele-
vant tools used for collecting and analyzing flows information
are Argus and nfdump [32]. Argus collects and transforms
session data [54], which are displayed and analyzed with the
Ra client [32], [55]. Nfdump is a set of tools (including
nfcapd and the homonym command nfdump) for collecting
and processing NetFlow data through the command line.
Nfcapd collects NetFlow data while nfdump reads the
files stored by nfcapd using an analysis syntax similar to
that of tcpdump [32], [56].
TRAFFIC STATISTICS
This information is related to certain features of the net-
work traffic, such as traffic volume or type of traffic, among
others. Statistics do not allow to perform a forensic anal-
ysis per se, but help security operators in their investi-
gation, complementing the data collected by other tools.
One of the most extended tools to gather traffic statistics
from network interfaces is the Simple Network Manage-
ment Packet (SNMP) [57]. SNMP is an application layer
protocol that allows to retrieve and interchange management
information from network devices. This information can be
collected using for example the Open SNMP3 distribution.
Wireshark and tshark can also be used to obtain traffic
statistics.
2) LOGS AND STATE SENSORS
Logs and state sensors gather information from applica-
tions or operating systems, among others. These sensors can
be used either individually or to complement the information
collected by other sensors that usually provide more detailed
information. The sources include (but are not limited to):
network management protocols, such as SNMP; system logs,
such as syslog, which can be captured with tools like
syslog [58]; or Application Logs obtained, for example, from
Apache or sendmail.
SYSLOG
This is a protocol implemented in the application layer to gen-
erate logs related to the activities in a system. This protocol
records events, such as logins to a host or a server. This is
also useful to launch alerts related to activities or errors in the
operating system or the hardware, among others. Considering
the type of resource that generates a record, in combination to
the type of alert, it is possible to establish a scale of priorities,
which is useful to help the security operators to manage such
alerts.
APPLICATION LOGS
Each application service, such as web surfing or the e-mail,
has its own format to record the logging information. Apache
web server or Sendmail are only examples of applications
that can generate logs. Apache is the most extended web
3https://sourceforge.net/projects/opensnmp/
server. It can provide data about the configuration of the
websites as well as the databases, but also statistics about
access to web pages. On the other hand, Sendmail is a
Mail Transport Agent, which is in charge of routing the e-
mails to their destination. Email logging data can be useful
to investigate whether an affected host had exchanged any
message with other machines before being compromised, and
the nature of such messages.
Application Log sensors allow anomaly detection, regis-
tration of system accesses (both successful and failed), and
prioritization in relation to the type of resource involved in an
anomaly. This information can be useful for the investigation
after an IT Security incident is detected [5], [15].
3) COMMAND-BASED PARSERS
Command-based parsers are Linux commands that can be
used to find patterns matching with regular expressions.
Depending on the selected command, they allow taking dif-
ferent actions on the filtered data. Thus, they can be used to
create scripts for data parsing. Some of the best known Linux
commands that allow parsing are awk, grep, or sed. [59], [60].
4) SOFTWARE-BASED PARSERS
Software-based parsers are programs that allow extracting
information from complex data. To do it, they look into
the data to extract patterns automatically. This is performed
by means of algorithms and configuration rules, rather than
only using regular expressions. Some examples of tools that
implement the parser module are Logstash [61] and the
FCParser [22]. Logstash is part of the Elastic Stack [20],
while the FCParser is a library for network data pars-
ing. Both tools can parse data from several and disparate
sources, including the transformation from unstructured data
into structured data and the management of big data.
B. MULTI-MODULE SOLUTIONS
This section collects some network security tools that imple-
ment several NSM modules. Due to its growing importance in
the last years, we pay special attention to Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) / Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs), Security
Event Managements (SEMs) / Security Information and Event
Managements (SIEMs) systems, Universal Threat Manage-
ments (UTMs), and tool collections; including examples of
both open source and commercial solutions. We also consider
other well-known security tools that are interesting from the
NSM perspective, since they might be also considered security
sensors.
Table 1 summarizes the studied solutions and the NSM
modules that they include. This table aims to provide a quick
insight into the main functionalities and features that the best
known NSM solutions can provide. The ’X’ is used to indicate
that the solution implements the corresponding component,
while the ’-’ symbol is used to indicate that the corresponding
component is not implemented in the solution. The ’♦’ sym-
bol is used to denote that the solution does not implement that
component but there exist plugins to implement it. Finally,
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the ’F’ symbol is used to point out that the solution integrates
another tool to implement the corresponding component.
1) IDSs AND IPSs
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are one of the most
used security tools. They are mainly composed of a sen-
sor, a parser, and a detection engine. When these systems
also allow to deploy defensive responses to attacks, i.e. they
include an actuator module, they are called Intrusion Pre-
vention Systems (IPSs). Some of the IDSs have evolved to
Security Event Management (SEM) systems, which include
an integrator module to improve the capability of detection
by collecting data from different sources [32].
IDSs are systems that implement a set of techniques to
detect suspicious activities (potential intrusions) by monitor-
ing and analyzing the events in a network or a device [28],
[32], [34]. They are classified as Host IDS (HIDS) and Net-
work IDS (NIDS) according to the origin of the collected
data [31], [34], [62]. HIDSs are deployed in end systems
(hosts) and monitor user activity and the behavior of internal
processes [5], [31], [33], [34]. NIDSs first collect data from
the network using any of the aforementioned network traffic
sensors; then, they analyze the data to find security viola-
tions. Regardless the type of IDS, once data are received and
identified as (potentially) harmful, the system alerts security
operators.
Since the best known IDSs are open source, we only include
this category in our review.
SNORT
This is the most popular IDS, and it can be used also as a
sniffer [34]. Snort is a signature-based NIDS, which allows
port scanning, as well as registering and alerting for any
defined anomaly. In the latest releases, this IDS also permits
to define basic responses in form of rules that allow blocking
network traffic related to a given alert [63]. Unified2 is
the output logging format generated by Snort. Logging can
be generated in three modes: packet logging, alert logging,
and true unified logging [64]. Packet logging is used for
packet captures while alert logging only registers IT Security
events. True unified logging allows recording both events
and packets.
SURICATA
Suricata is both a real-time network IDS and a network IPS.
It monitors the network traffic and performs offline process-
ing of pcap files. Suricata is signature-based and provides
the output in standard formats, such as YAML or JSON, but it
can also be configured to generate logs in Unified2 [65],
[66].
OSSEC
This is an open source HIDS that performs log analysis,
integrity checking, monitoring of Windows records, and
rootkit detection. In addition, OSSEC provides alerts andmain-
tains a copy of the modified files to perform forensics tasks.
It also allows to configure firewall rules to block malicious
network traffic, including specific IP addresses. OSSEC is
multi-platform, since it can be used in most of the operating
systems. Although this engine has some SIEM features, such
as allowing the correlation of logs from several devices and
formats, and mechanisms for compliance of security policies,
it has been traditionally considered to be an IDS [67].
2) SEM AND SIEM SYSTEMS
A Security Event Management (SEM) system is in charge
of ‘‘1the collection, analysis and escalation of indications
and warnings to detect and respond to intrusions’’ [24]. Its
aim is to visualize and understand network data by using a
single and unified tool that combines different data sources
(integrator). For that purpose, a SEM allows pivoting among
different data sources to carry out data analysis and forensics,
which reduces considerably the time needed to investigate
a security incident (especially if the pivoting is graphically
assisted) [24]. One of the features that makes a SEM system to
be such a powerful tool is that it allows the visualization and
prioritization of the events, thus helping security operators to
interpret and understand the alarms [34], [68].
A Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
system can be described following the definition provided
by Gartner [68], [69] as a system that ‘‘analyzes event data
in real time for early detection of targeted attacks and data
breaches, and collects, stores, investigates and reports on log
data for incident response, forensics and regulatory compli-
ance’’. SIEM systems are the combination of two different
systems: SEM and Security Information Management (SIM)
systems. The main difference in relation to the SEM is that
a SIEM also performs reports and include features for regu-
latory compliance, while the SEM does not necessary do that
(indeed, this is a functionality usually provided by the SIM
module). SIEM are the most popular (and expensive) type of
integrator systems in the industry. Like SEMs systems, SIEMs
are usually composed of at least the following components:
sensor, parser, integrator, detector and inspector. They can
also include response modules.
We start this classification with a SEM and three SIEMs that
are open source: Zeek, Prelude,Wazuh and OSSIM.
ZEEK (Bro)
Zeek was originally developed by Vern Paxson and Robin
Sommer [70] as a research work called Bro. Now, it has
evolved and it is widely used by companies, as well as
research and educative organizations [70]. This is a complete
open source tool for NSM that permits both anomaly and
signature based detection [32], [70]. Zeek collects network
traffic using libpcap. Then, the engine of events processes
the data, performing a passive analysis on such data. It also
allows collection and analysis of sessions of particular ser-
vices. In addition, Zeek can be programmed to take actions in
the evaluation of events (e.g. to execute a program to provide
active response for the detected event) and offers forensics
capabilities thanks to its mechanism of event logging [70],
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TABLE 1. NSM modules provided by the studied solutions. The ’X’ is used to indicate that the solution implements the corresponding component. The ’-’
symbol is used to denote that the corresponding component is not implemented in the solution. The ’♦’ symbol is used to point out that the solution
does not implement that component but there exist plugins to implement it. The ’F’ symbol is used to indicate that the solution integrates another tool
to implement the corresponding component.
[71]. Although it is usually included in the IDS classification,
Zeek can be considered a SEM [4], [24], [70].
PRELUDE
This is a SIEM for Linux that collects, normalizes, combines
and correlates security events. Prelude implements the IDMEF
standard format (RFC 4765) as a part of the parsing compo-
nent, so that it can read a wide range of log formats [72].
In addition, it generates reports about events. Its interface
provides a forensic mode that allows to investigate data from
large periods [73]. Therefore, Prelude implements all the
NSM components excepting the response module. This SIEM
can be used in a commercial version, which prices are cus-
tomized for each organization and depend on the volume of
events [74].
WAZUH
This is a SIEM for signature-based intrusion detection, which
was developed by the homonym company [75]. Wazuh is
based in OSSEC and it is used in combination with the Elas-
tic Stack [21]. This allows the monitoring of the system
for security analysis, intrusion and vulnerability detection.
Furthermore, Wazuh provides response to security incidents,
including integrity and compliance [75]. Thanks to the Elastic
Stack features [20], the parsing component is implemented.
OSSIM
This SIEM was developed by Alien Vault (AT&T Cyber-
security since February 2019) [76], and it uses the Open
Threat Exchange R©(OTX R©) [77] threat intelligence module,
which allows the users to contribute and receive updated
information in real-time about security information. OSSIM
allows the collection, normalization and correlation of events.
Thus, the capabilities of OSSIM include discovering assets,4
assessing vulnerabilities, intrusion detection, monitoring of
behavior, and correlation of events [78]. It integrates differ-
ent software modules to provide a complete NSM solution.
Among other tools, this solution includes both a host and a
network IDS. The NIDS part provides intrusion detection and
network traffic scanning. It also looks for signatures of the
latest attacks, as well as for malware or other possible ways
of attempting to compromise the system. The HIDS analyzes
the behavior and state of the system, alerting when it suspects
that there is somethingwrong. Similarly to other SIEMs, OSSIM
allows to detect and prioritize the most important threats and
anomalies [78].
Commercial Tools
This part of the section covers two examples of commercial
SIEM systems, both included in the Gartner’s ‘‘Magic Quad-
rant for Security Information and Event Management’’ for
2020 [79]. Magic quadrants assess the products in the market
according to a set of criteria, which are mainly the Ability to
Execute and the Completeness of Vision. Ability to Execute
refers to the economic power of a vendor to implement rele-
vant functionalities, andCompleteness of Vision can be seen
as the ability to understand present and future needs of the
market. The Magic Quadrant of Gartner has four categories:
Leaders, Challengers, Visionaries and Niche Players. Lead-
ers have both high ability to execute and completeness of
vision of themarket,Challengers have high ability to execute
but limited vision on the market, Visionaries have a good
vision of the market but do not have competitive ability to
execute, and Niche Players are focused in a small segment
of the market (or do not have a complete vision of it) and
have a limited ability to execute [80].
4 In the case of OSSIM, asset is referred to machines.
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Some of the most highlighted SIEM, according to theMagic
Quadrant [79], are: Splunk and IBM (‘‘Leaders’’); AT&T
Cybersecurity andFireEye (‘‘Niche Players’’); and LogPoint
(the only one in the ‘‘Visionaries’’ category). Our classifica-
tion covers Splunk and AT&T Cybersecurity.
SPLUNK
This is a commercial SIEM, which performs network mon-
itoring and real-time data collection, parsing and correla-
tion. Splunk also allows incident management (e.g. running
a script or applying threat intelligence) and forensic analysis
thanks to its mechanism of event correlation. It allows data
and event analysis, providing visibility and context of the
alerts. In addition, it uses Big Data techniques to integrate the
data from the organization to be monitored (User Behavior
Analytics), allowing to improve the intrusion detection by
using machine learning algorithms [81], [82]. Splunk is con-
sidered as a Leader in the Gartner’s Magic Quadrant because
it provides SIEM solutions that i) are compatible with other
different SIEM systems and scenarios and ii) are scalable and
allow performing a wide range of actions related to both log
management and response against IT security incidents (see
Gartner’s Magic Quadrant in [83]).
USM (AlienVault R©UNIFIED SECURITY Management R©)
This is a commercial SIEM based in OSSIM, and it was also
developed by Alien Vault (AT&T Cybersecurity since Febru-
ary 2019) [76]. USM is a unified platform for threat detection
and policy compliance (which is one of the main differences
in relation to OSSIM, see [84] for more details), as well as inci-
dent response. AlienVault USM Anywhere provides USM as
a cloud service [76]. Although it does not provide an inspector
module, it is possible to complete this part of the NSM cycle
by using the plug-in AlienApp [85]. USM is considered as
a Niche Players in the Gartner’s Magic Quadrant, since it
is focused in specific sectors (such as financial services and
healthcare) that are usually Small and Medium Businesses
(see Gartner’s Magic Quadrant in [83]).
3) UTMs
This is a type of ‘‘multi-function network security product
used by small or midsize business’’ [86]. These devices have
high level functionalities (multi-function gateway), which
can be, for example, a firewall in the application layer of the
TCP/IP and OSI models, Intrusion Prevention and Detection
(IPS and IDS), antivirus, anti-spam and anti-phishing [87],
[88]. The main advantages of the UTMs are their reduced cost
and complexity, while the drawbacks are that UTMs usually
have limited processing power, and they cannot correlate
events.
Since these are hardware solutions, it is not possible to
find open source implementations. Thus, we only include
commercial tools in this part of the review.
This part of the section shows three examples of com-
mercial UTM systems, all of them included in the Gartner’s
‘‘Magic Quadrant for Universal Threat Management’’ for
2018 [89], [90]. Again, this quadrant assesses the UTMs in
the market according to the same criteria as for SIEM systems
and classifies them in: Leaders, Challengers, Visionaries and
Niche Players (recall Section III-B2).
Some of the most highlighted UTM, according to the Magic
Quadrant [89], [90], are: Huawei and SonicWall (‘‘Chal-
lengers’’); Fortinet and Sophos (‘‘Leaders’’); Juniper Net-
works and Barracuda Networks (‘‘Niche Players’’); and
WatchGuard (the only one in the ‘‘Visionaries’’ category, and
close to be a ‘‘Leader’’). Our classification covers Sophos,
Barracuda Networks, and WatchGuard.
BARRACUDA CloudGen FIREWALL
This is a commercial UTM that provides intrusion detec-
tion and protection. CloudGen Firewall also protects against
known attacks, such as Denial of Service (DoS) or botnet
attacks. In addition, this solution enables authentication and
VPN connection. Its firewall allows packet inspection and
filtering [91]. CloudGen Firewall is classified as a Niche
Player in the Gartner’s Magic Quadrant in 2018 [89].
WatchGuard
This is a commercial UTM that provides intrusion detec-
tion and protection. WatchGuard correlates data from dif-
ferent sources, which enhances its capability of detection
and response against threats, being also able of generating
reports. In addition, it provides an antivirus functionality
and application control, which is related to user’s behavior.
WatchGuard offers an Advanced Persistent Threat blocker
that allows detecting and acting against complex attacks, such
as ransomware; and it also has a spam prevention functional-
ity [92]. WatchGuard is considered to be the only Visionary
in the Gartner’s Magic Quadrant in 2018 [89].
SOPHOS
This is a commercial UTM that provides intrusion detec-
tion and protection. Sophos allows discovering and acting
against threats, which makes it possible mitigating the effect
of such threats. After Sophos detects an infected system,
it isolates that system. In addition, it provides mechanisms
for remote access, such as VPNs. This solution also includes
an advanced firewall to monitor traffic data and anti-spam
functionalities [93]. Sophos is classified as a Leader in the
Gartner’s Magic Quadrant in 2018 [89].
4) TOOL COLLECTIONS
This type of network security tools are composed of a number
of disparate software solutions. Furthermore, since they are
open source they are continuously evolving.
SGUIL
This is a set of open source tools for network security moni-
toring, which allows to collect, analyze, alert and respond to
intrusions [4], [94]. Sguil provides a real-time interface and
includes two IDSs [34], [94]. Some of the tools that compose
Sguil are [94]:
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• MySQL, as a database service.
• Snort and Suricata, for network intrusion detection and
scanning as well as packets logging and solving alerts.
Squert5 is an evolution of Sguil which also uses OSSEC
and Zeek for intrusion detection [95].
• Tcpdump, to collect network traffic from the logs of the
packets.
• Wireshark, to analyze the collected packets.
SECURITY ONION
This is a collection of open source tools, which is provided as
a Linux distribution. Security Onion allows tomonitor, record
andmanage logs, as well as to perform intrusion detection and
response against IT Security Incidents [96]. It implements all
the NSM modules. Some of the tools that compose Security
Onion are [96]:
• Elastic Stack and Logstash, as a search and analysis
engine that also transform and centralize the data, pro-
viding visualization functionalities and implementing
the parsing module [21], [61], [97].
• Snort, Suricata and Zeek, for network intrusion detec-
tion, scanning and issuing alerts, as well as packets
logging.
• Wazuh, for host intrusion detection.
• Sguil, for network security monitoring and event drive
analysis.
• Squert, to consult and visualize Sguil data.
• Cyberchef, to encrypt, compress and analyze data.
• NetworkMiner, for forensic analysis.
5) OTHER WELL-KNOWN SECURITY TOOLS (Security
Sensors)
In this section we have included some systems, resources, and
tools that, from the NSM perspective, provide useful security
information. Thus, although these are security tools by them-
selves, they also can be considered acting like security sensors
as a part of more complex NSM systems (e.g. SIEM systems).
FIREWALLS
Firewall logs are one of the most useful security data
sources, since they provide information about each access
(failed or successful, authorized or not) to the network. One
of the main advantages of firewalls is that they can be found
in any network. We can find basic examples, such as the
one provided as a part of Windows Defender in Windows
10 operating systems [98]; but also advanced firewalls, such
as Sophos [93], which actually are enclosed in UTM solutions.
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Vulnerability assessment tools are run on the network and
end systems. These tools unveil weaknesses and security
holes that may enable an unauthorized access to the system.
Two well-known tools for this purpose are Nmap [99] and
Nessus [100]. Nmap (Network Mapper) is an open source
5http://www.squertproject.org/
program for port scanning to evaluate the security of the
operating systems, allowing to discover vulnerabilities and
providing useful information about open ports and services.
Although Nmap was originally developed for Linux, it is
now multi-platform [4], [32], [33], [99]. Nessus is also a
multi-platform program for vulnerability scanning in oper-
ating systems. Originally, Nessus was open source, but
now it is private software (although there are open-source
alternatives, such as OpenVAS (Open Vulnerability Assess-
ment Scanner) [101]). The vulnerability assessment analysis
usually starts with a port scanning, which can be done, for
example, using Nmap. Once the open ports are discovered,
Nessus sends a number of probes against such ports to
unveil existing vulnerabilities. The results can be exported to
different formats, such as plain text or XML [100].
Other useful resources that allow to obtain vulnerability
data are the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases.
NVD is a public service provided by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology of the United States (NIST)
to enumerate and classify existing vulnerabilities in current
software and hardware [32], [102]. CVE is another simi-
lar service provided by the MITRE6 that also includes the
NVD [103]. These databases offer the most updated informa-
tion about known vulnerabilities in operating systems and
applications/services, and their solution (if known). Vulner-
abilities are usually discovered either using any of the afore-
mentioned or similar tools.
FIM
FIM systems allow to detect changes in the files stored at
the devices in relation to a base copy of such files. Some
of the parameters that are checked by a FIM are: i) the
modification/creation date, ii) the permissions of access and
modification, and iii) the checksum (hash) of the contents.
One of the problems of this type of data source is the huge
volume of data and the number of false positives that it tends
to generate. One of the tools that implements FIM capabilities
is OSSEC [67].
ANTIVIRUS
These programs are used to detect and remove malware from
computers. Antivirus software are usually signature and/or
rule based, and they are designed to analyze computer files.
They are not typically designed to work as sensors. Yet,
sometimes it is possible to configure them for log gen-
eration, which makes them useful as security sensors for
NSM systems [104]–[108]. For example, Kaspersky has both
free and commercial antivirus [109]. The first one provides
basic protection while the commercial version provides addi-
tional tools such as VPN connection or password manage-
ment. Another well-known example of antivirus isWindows
Defender, which is included in Windows 10 operating sys-
tem [98].
6https://www.mitre.org/
112752 VOLUME 9, 2021
M. Fuentes-García et al.: Present and Future of NSM
THREAT INTELLIGENCE
This is a mechanism, similar to a social network or RSS
feeds, which allows users to contribute and receive updated
information about security threats and/or issues. It allows
sharing useful security information among organizations,
which can also be useful to enhance detection engines. For
example, if an organization detects a new attack, the rest of
organizations using threat intelligence are informed, allowing
them to prevent or deal with the attack in a more efficient
way. Furthermore, threat intelligence uses knowledge related
to the organization, including context or risk indicators, but
also existing reports about previous attacks, among other
data [110]. The goal of using information from the organi-
zation is to foresee threats based in the previous experience,
taking into account threats both inner or external organi-
zation. Threat Intelligence tools are in charge of collecting
this information and generating reports or alarms that can be
integrated with other security mechanisms, such as SIEM sys-
tems. Threat connect [111] and Cyber Threat Alliance [112]
are two commercial tools for threat intelligence, while Open
Threat Intelligence [77] and Collective Intelligent Frame-
work [113] are examples of open source solutions.
IV. NSM APPLICATION AND CHALLENGES FOR NEW
PARADIGMS IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
5G networks and new communication paradigms, such as the
Internet of Things (IoT) or cloud computing, make network
management to be more complex [7], [114]–[118]. The wide
adoption of the 5G leads to massive data generation, which is
getting more andmore increased at a high pace [7], [8], [114],
[119]. Big Data processing, as well as feature extraction and
data correlation are some of the main challenges affecting
anomaly detection and, thus, intrusion detection, which are a
main part of the NSM philosophy. Someworks tackle intrusion
detection in high-dimensional data from an anomaly detec-
tion perspective [8], [119].
In addition, distributed and decentralized networks are
present and future of technology. This implies numerous
benefits but also new challenges, specially for network secu-
rity. In this section, we focus on some of the most relevant
communication models in the present: i) SDN, and ii) IoT/
Industrial IoT (IIoT). In addition, we review those tools that
were included in Section III and its potential use for each
of the aforementioned modern networks. Finally, we identify
current research needs for the proposedmodules in Section II.
A. MULTI-MODULE NSM SOLUTIONS AND WORKS FOR
MODERN NETWORKS
This section lists and classifies a collection of security solu-
tions for modern network that cover one or more NSM mod-
ules, following the proposed taxonomy. Table 2 summarizes
the reviewed solutions and the NSMmodules that they include.
This table aims providing a quick insight into the main func-
tionalities and features that these works can cover from the
NSM perspective. The ’X’ is used to indicate that the solu-
tion implements the corresponding component, while the ’-’
symbol is used to indicate that the corresponding component
is either not implemented or its covering is not clear in the
solution.
SDN
The huge data volume derived from using mobile networks
massively led to a new proposal for networks management
optimization in 2016: the softwarization and virtualization of
networks (SDN and Network Function Virtualization (NFV),
respectively) [114]. Yet, these new paradigms are at the same
time solution and problem from the security perspective. Like
this, adopting SDN and NFVs introduce new vulnerabilities and
security requirements, being the availability one of the most
relevant [114], [116], [120], [126].
A number of works tackle these new security issues
related to the SDN, some of them aiming to enhance the
detection techniques or following a security monitoring
approach [116], [120], [121], [123], [124], [126]–[128],
[132]. In addition, Santos da Silva et al manifest the need
of human intervention during the monitoring cycle [120].
On the contrary, other authors are more focused in a complete
automation of the process, using deep learning to implement
IDSs to increase data correlation and to be able to detect
zero-day attacks [11], [121]. Finally, other authors follow
approaches such asmalwaremonitoring [131] or Threat Intel-
ligence for SDN [132].
Additionally, it has been highlighted that it is needed to
adapt traditional intrusion detection to virtualized networks,
more precisely, to SDN [116], [120]. In this sense, some of the
tools that where analyzed in Section III have been used in the
SDN scope. For example, Snort is applied for intrusion and
Distributed DoS (DDoS) detection by different authors [122],
[124], [125]. On the other hand, Suricata is also used for
intrusion detection in SDN [127], [128]. Finally, Barracuda,
Sophos and WatchGuard provide SD-WAN (SDN-Wide Area
Network) solutions [93], [129], [130], [144], [145].
IoT AND IIoT
IoT is characterized by designing a myriad of devices/gadgets
that can be connected anywhere to a network. These
devices range from smartphones to cars, but also include
daily objects, such as fridges or televisions, and products
in warehouses and stores. Nowadays, devices are hyper-
connected both in local environments (e.g. personal wear-
ables or smart homes) and in wide environments (e.g.
smart cities) [146]. IoT networks are decentralized, which,
in combination with its own nature, makes the tradi-
tional security requirements to be affected. There are a
number of challenges and requirements in IoT security
[147]–[152]. Similar to traditional networks, the most rel-
evant requirements are related to privacy, confidentiality,
integrity and availability. The latter is currently one of the
most challenging issues in network security [147]–[152]. In
general terms, the most important needs in IoT security are:
providing scalability, interoperability, managing Big Data,
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TABLE 2. NSM solutions and works in modern networks. The ’X’ is used to indicate that the solution implements the corresponding component. The ’-’
symbol is used to point out that the corresponding component is not implemented in the solution.
tackling with restricted resources, and providing resilience
and robustness [147]–[150], [152].
All the aforementioned needs are extensible to the NSM
philosophy. Furthermore, data integration and correlation are
other important challenges from the NSM perspective [8],
[153]. Recently, some authors have pointed the need of
designing and implementing high-level SIEMs and effec-
tive IDSs that can be adapted to IoT protocols [137], [152],
[154]–[156]. Most of research papers in recent years have
been focused in the proposal of new IDSs and/or enhanc-
ing the detection methods [133], [135], [137]–[139], [157].
Additionally, some authors take explicitly into account the
constraints in IoT resources in their IDS proposal [137].
Other authors highlight the necessity of anomaly detection
and mitigation in IoT networks [156], [158], as well as
the lack of IoT datasets for training and testing detection
algorithms [13], [141].
In relation to commercial tools, Bitdefender proposes an
IoT solution that provides different alternatives depending on
the pricing [142]. These features range from ’Cloud Essen-
tials’ (it only includes basic protection) to IoT ’Full Stack’
(including, IDS and IPS, anomaly detection, and DDoS detec-
tion and protection among others) [142], [159]. This tool is
recommended by Kaspersky as an alternative option to their
scan tool (in a Beta state since 2018) [106]. Finally, Avast
provides a monitoring solution for smart homes, which aims
to prevent, detect and contain security incidents related to all
the connected devices [143], [160].
Furthermore, some authors highlight that there is a
need to adapt traditional security mechanisms to IoT net-
works [147], [151]. In this sense, if we review the tools
analyzed in Section III, Barracuda is the only one that
has an IoT version of its traditional product, CloudGen
Firewall [161].
On the other hand, according to Gartner, one of the most
relevant global risks in the end of 2019 and the first quarter
of 2020 was derived from the convergence between physical
and cybernetic world. This connection is in part empowered
by the massive IoT adoption. In March of 2020, this risk was
relegated to a secondary place after the pandemic situation
was declared [162], [163]. Yet, there is still a high risk that
is greatly due to the wide adoption of IoT in different scopes
such as smart homes, e-health or smart cities. Besides, IoT
has been successfully adopted in industry, which applica-
tion is called Industrial IoT (IIoT) [118], [146], [164]–[166].
This aims monitoring and controlling industrial processes to
enhance their effectiveness and quality [164]. Thus, IIoT is of
utmost importance in gas, petrol and energy industries (which
are also considered critical infrastructures); and it is gaining
relevance in other areas, such as agriculture and health [155],
[165]–[170]. Thus, IIoT can be considered to be one of the
pillars of Industry 4.0 [118], [165], [167], [168].
IIoT inherits complexity and risks from IoT. Addition-
ally, it has particular requirements that, sometimes, are
related to the deal with risks and lower them in critical
infrastructures. Some of the highlighted requirements and
challenges are scalability, authentication, integrity, availabil-
ity and resilience [118], [154], [155], [164], [167], [169],
[171]. Similar to what happens for IoT, most of research
works are focused in IDS proposals [12], [134], [153] and
attacks/anomaly detection (mainly ML-based) [136], [140],
[172].
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In relation to commercial tools, if we come back to the
tools in Section III, Splunk is the only SIEM that is explicitly
indicated for monitoring IIoT environments [173].
B. CURRENT RESEARCH CHALLENGES FOR NSM
We believe that NSM could benefit to each of the communica-
tion network areas under study, although there are still open
issues to tackle. Below, we summarize the main challenges
that, to the best of our knowledge, still need further research
work for each of the NSMmodules identified in the taxonomy
proposed in Section II.
• Sensor Module. This is a well-established component,
which is widely covered in the reviewed works. Most of
the individual sensors enumerated in Section III can be
used in modern networks together with new sensors that
are implicit in the nature of some of them, such as IoT
and IIoT.
• Parser Module. This component is considered in some
of the studied works from the point of view of self-
feature extraction. In some cases, a unification and
redundancy reduction is also performed. However, there
is still a research room, which should be focused towards
establishing a unified format for event logging and fea-
ture extraction from Big Data.
• Integrator Module. This is one of the most important
and useful NSM modules, since it allows aggregating
data from different sources. Integrating is even more
relevant for modern communication paradigms, where
a number of heterogeneous devices are sending and
receiving information that needs to be unified for its
monitoring and incident detection. Yet, only four of
the studied works take into account this module in an
explicit manner. For this reason, finding a strategy to
integrate, aggregate and correlate different data sources
is still one of the main challenges for researchers.
• Detection Module. Most of current research works are
mainly focused in this module, aiming to find new ways
for applyingML algorithms and thus improving the capa-
bility of anomalies and/or attacks detection. One of the
main challenges for this component is Big Data process-
ing to create and apply detection models. Furthermore,
prioritizing alarms and reducing the number of false
positives are still open issues.
• Inspector Module. This component aims to locate an
incident both physically and in time. This is even more
important when we talk about decentralized networks
(e.g. IoT), due to: i) the source of the event might not
be placed in the same location as the event, and ii) a
number of different devices are probably interchanging
information thorough the network. Yet, only two of
the reviewed works include an inspector module. This
component needs further research, not only to provide
logs and store the state after an incident takes place,
but to make them interpretable. This will help security
operators to understand the facts and make them more
efficient in their forensic work.
• Actuator Module. This module is taken into account
in many of the works under study, which define some
actions such as blocking malicious connections. The
main challenges for this component are defining and
implementing self-recovery mechanisms to make the
communications networks resilient. This is specially
important in critical systems, typically related to IIoT
environments.
Finally, scalability and compatibility with restricted
resources (the latter specially for IoT and IIoT) are common
issues that are open for each of these modules. In addition,
solutions available in the market need to be updated in order
to overcome these challenges and provide modern solutions
covering most of the NSM modules. If these solutions are
designed following this philosophy, they will be more scal-
able and it will be easier to complete and enhance them.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we review the state-of-the-art for Network
Security Monitoring (NSM), providing an overall insight and
a unified classification of its main components. Our taxon-
omy classifies such components as sensors, parsers, inte-
grators, detectors, inspectors and actuators. These modules
can be combined in different ways, yielding a powerful
and scalable architecture for incident detection. This work
highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the identified
modules.
We review existing solutions for NSM sensor and parser
modules, which can be found individually in the market.
Furthermore, we study some of the best known and widely
used multi-module NSM solutions, according to the proposed
taxonomy. The best known examples of these combinations
are IDSs/IPSs, SEMs/SIEMs and UTMs.
Finally, we assess the applicability of the NSM phi-
losophy in modern communications networks. We focus
this evaluation in SDN and IoT/IIoT networks. Open issues
and future research interests for each of the NSM mod-
ules in relation to new communications paradigms are
summarized.
We believe this paper is of interest both for the research
community and security practitioners, since it helps to focus
the efforts of research andmarket solutions in amore effective
manner. Furthermore, it allows the identification of tools and
methods that are available to collect and process network
security data for incident detection.
To conclude, we believe that the security landscape for both
traditional and modern networks would be benefited from i)
the investigation and development of inspector and actuator
modules, which are the least developed solutions to date; and
ii) the design of systems which include all the components
identified. In addition, it is still needed to provide efficient
solutions that take into account the restricted resources in
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AUC Area Under the Curve
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DoS Denial of Service
DDoS Distributed DoS
FIM File Integrity Monitoring
GUI Graphical User Interface
HIDS Host IDS
IDMEF Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IPS Intrusion Prevention System




NFV Network Function Virtualization
NIDS Network IDS
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology of
the United States
NSM Network Security Monitoring
NTP Network Time Protocol
NVD National Vulnerability Database
OSSEC Open Source HIDS SECurity
OSSIM Open Source Security Information Management
P2P Peer to Peer
PCA Principal Component Analysis
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristics
SEM Security Event Management
SDN Software Defined Network
SIEM Security Information and Event Management
SIM Security Information Management
SNMP Simple Network Management Packet
UTM Universal Threat Management
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